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ABSTRACT
Background Research on patient care has identified
substantial variations in the quality and safety of
healthcare and the considerable risks of iatrogenic harm
as significant issues. These failings contribute to the high
rates of potentially avoidable morbidity and mortality and
to the rising levels of healthcare expenditure seen in
many health systems. There have been substantial
developments in information technology in recent
decades and there is now real potential to apply these
technological developments to improve the provision of
healthcare universally. Of particular international interest
is the use of eHealth applications. There is, however,
a large gap between the theoretical and empirically
demonstrated benefits of eHealth applications. While
these applications typically have the technical capability
to help professionals in the delivery of healthcare,
inadequate attention to the socio-technical dimensions of
their use can result in new avoidable risks to patients.
Results and discussion Given the current lack of
evidence on quality and safety improvements and on the
costebenefits associated with the introduction of
eHealth applications, there should be a focus on
implementing more mature technologies; it is also
important that eHealth applications should be evaluated
against a comprehensive and rigorous set of measures,
ideally at all stages of their application life cycle.
INTRODUCTION
World Health Organization (WHO) Patient Safety
established the Information Technology for Patient
Safety Expert Working Group to examine the role
of Information Technology (IT) in improving
patient safety in healthcare. The Working Group
included representatives from high-, middle- and
low-income countries with expertise from clinical
medicine, academia, government, health services
management and industry. This report by the
Working Group provides an overview of the inter-
play between IT and issues of patient safety in
healthcare, maps out the boundaries of knowledge
in this area and makes recommendations for future
research and development. It builds on a recent
systematic literature review commissioned by the
English National Health Service (NHS) Connecting
for Health Evaluation Programme, which included
a review of research papers from across the world.
We identiﬁed priority areas through a consulta-
tion process involving all members of the Working
Group. Although there are concerns about the
variable methodological quality and completeness
of the evidence base in the ﬁelddparticularly in the
evaluation of the impact of new technology in
healthcare on patient safetydthere is a speciﬁc lack
of information on the experience in developing
countries. The majority of published research has
been carried out in high-income countries such as
the UK and USA. This paper is therefore most
applicable to economically developed countries;
however, where possible, we have also drawn
lessons for economically developing countries and
illustrated the key points from the paper with
a number of case studies.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN HEALTHCARE
The US government has deﬁned IT as ‘.any
equipment or interconnected system or subsystem
of equipment that is used in the creation, conver-
sion or duplication of data or information.’1 This
paper focuses on the information transacting role,
considering those applications where there is
a transformative or integrative element involving
information. The focus is on the role of software
and platforms that integrate information from
these and other sources (eg, electronic patient
records). We consider the requirements that might
be made at a softwareehardware-systems level to
address issues of patient safety, but in-depth
exploration of issues around technical imple-
mentations of software and hardware lay outside
the scope of this paper. Reﬂecting this higher level
view, we consider issues of patient safety relating to
the key applications for information tools in
healthcare delivery rather than considering each
component separately.
The rationale for this selective approach reﬂects
the priorities identiﬁed by the Working Group and
the focus of IT implementation in healthcare
internationally. There is signiﬁcant interest in the
potential for IT to address some of the current
challenges facing healthcare systems, speciﬁcally:
< the resource and cost implications of serving
populations with increasing life expectancy and
improved survival in chronic illness;
< continuing deﬁciencies in the provision of
healthcare that result in iatrogenic harm;
< opportunities to use IT to improve access to
information by healthcare workers in developing
countries to enable them to deliver safe, effective
care.
New technologies have the capacity to both
extend and replace existing clinical and adminis-
trative processes in health. The term eHealth is
increasingly used to acknowledge that technolog-
ical innovation is simply a component of a larger
process of change, which ideally represents ‘a new
way of working, an attitude and a commitment for
networked, global thinking to improve healthcare
locally, regionally and worldwide. ’2 The concep-
tual map of eHealth (ﬁgure 1) developed recently
by Pagliari et al identiﬁes three top-level domains:
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storing and managing data; informing and supporting decisions;
and delivering expertise and care at a distance.
Information technology may reinforce existing barriers and
introduce new barriers to error; for example, by preventing
speciﬁc unsafe actions (active failures). Similarly, in ensuring
that certain information is uniformly available or in reducing the
time required to complete certain tasks, tools can actively
address latent failures. Conversely, the introduction of a tool can
disrupt an existing process in a way that introduces a new
source of risk, perform incorrectly under certain conditions or
facilitate unsafe behaviours by workers.
IT AND PATIENT SAFETY AT THE POINT OF CARE
Supporting care decisions
Every patient journey involves multiple decisions made by the
team of healthcare professionals responsible for the patient’s
care. Each team member has the potential for active error, as
well as contributing to an environment in which the scope for
future errors might be enhanced. IT should therefore be used to
ensure that optimal choices are made at every step of a patient’s
care pathway. IT must also be used to limit decisions that are
clearly wrong and where there is a signiﬁcant risk of iatrogenic
harm. Although the scope for harm varies by decision type,
deciding not to do something can be as harmful as an incorrect
active treatment intervention.
Computerised Decision Support Systems (CDSS) are ‘.active
knowledge systems which use. patient data to generate case-
speciﬁc advice.’3 These systems aimdwith varying degrees of
sophisticationdto support the care decision process. There are
good theoretical reasons to believe that CDSS can contribute to
patient safety. First, they can guarantee consistency of decision-
making; thus, the risk of violation or omission is mitigated.
Second, by incorporating speciﬁc contingencies for unusual
presentations conferring speciﬁc risks, errors associated with
cognitive lapses or bias can be controlled.
These aims can only be achieved if the outputs of such tools
are themselves correct and applied in clinical practice. Concerns
about the former stem partly from the lack of regulation in this
area and because the evidence on which such tools are based has
signiﬁcant gaps in some areas of practice, while expanding
rapidly in others. There is a risk that increasing sophistication
(eg, in tools that use dynamic inference) abstracts the decision-
making process in a way that such gaps are not made visible.
New risks also accrue from the information requirements that
such tools introduce: parameters must be supplied accurately
and for the right patient and relevant cofactors accurately
speciﬁed. In one series, for example, omitted data resulted in
77% (95% CI 71 to 83%) of recommendations made by a CDSS
being rated as potentially inappropriate and unsafe.4
The impact of incorrect clinical recommendations by CDSS
extends beyond the risk of iatrogenic harm. Negative percep-
tions about IT tools are an important determinant of their
continued use: if CDSS are perceived to produce unreliable
outputs, they may not ﬁnd use in routine clinical practice, and
all the potential beneﬁts are therefore negated. To combat this,
an active approach to quality assurance is advocated that
explicitly aims to mitigate the risks of covert error associated
with problems in the underlying knowledge basedfor example,
by including algorithmic validation of consistency and
completeness.5 Effective user interface design and active valida-
tion of input can serve to limit the scope for user-related error;
for example, user interfaces that are confusing or illogical can
induce errors even by the most skilled users. Good user interface
design requires a detailed understanding of how a technology
will be used and of the work environment to gauge the types of
errors that could arise in use and thereby eliminate or mitigate
their impact.
Data completeness is an important safety issue in its own
right. A given care decision might be inappropriate only in
speciﬁc contexts. Although redundancy is desirable, opportuni-
ties to capture the information that deﬁnes these contexts are
typically discrete; for example, a relevant medical history might
only be captured during the initial assessment of a patient.
Accurate medication history, details of any allergies and signiﬁ-
cant comorbidities are obvious examples that have the potential
to have a recurring effect on future care decisions. Such infor-
mation, once captured, should be accessible for all future
healthcare encounters and, where care involves multiple
providers, should be shared efﬁciently and securely between
providers.
Electronic Patient Records (EPR) underpin CDSS and many
other eHealth applications. One of the aims of the EPR is to
tackle issues of data completeness. Structured inputs can
mandate information recording, while the electronic format
minimises the risk that information is subsequently mislaid. For
example, in the UK, the EPRs used in primary care include
recording templates for many chronic diseases (eg, diabetes,
hypertension, coronary heart disease, etc) to ensure that key
Figure 1 Conceptual map of eHealth showing how the different domains integrate to support professionals, patients and the public.
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demographic, clinical, physiological, biochemical and pharma-
ceutical variables are collected systematically and in a stand-
ardised manner for all patients. However, a current issue in
many health systems, particularly in developing countries, is the
low level of uptake of EPR systems.
An electronic system can be self-diagnosing in terms of
measures of accuracy and completeness, and can motivate
speciﬁc remedial actions. Where interfaces are poorly designed,
however, or system reliability and performance effects clinical
practice and workload, such systems can introduce new clinical
risks. Empirical evidence for beneﬁt is currently limited and
compromised by poor methodological design: for example, there
is currently no strong evidence for a reduction in adverse drug
events with EPR implementation.6
Combating medication error
Mistakes in prescribing are one of the most common types of
medical error and can be potentially serious, sometimes leading
to death or disability for the patient.7 8 The initial prescription
order (decision-calculation) typically carries the greatest risk of
serious harm, but mistakes can occur at each stage of the
prescribing process:
< decision errors: failure to account for relevant comorbidities,
polypharmacy, previous reactions, incorrect decision;
< calculation errors: failure to calculate the appropriate dosage;
< communication errors: dosage written incorrectly, illegible
handwriting, wrong patient, ambiguous information on
prescription, medication not given in a timely fashion;
< monitoring error or incorrect length of treatment: failure to
track drugs with risk of accumulation of toxicity or where
time-limited treatment is desirable;
< slips: incorrect drugs or dose packaged at dispensation, drugs
given to wrong patient.
Electronic systems to support prescribing (ePrescribing solu-
tions) typically combine structured capture of prescription
requests with a varying degree of CDSS support. ePrescribing is
one facet of Computerised Provider Order Entry (CPOE), which
uses computer-based tools to record and communicate speciﬁc
clinical actions (eg, prescriptions, tests, interventions). The
potential impact on safety in terms of decision and calculation
error is similar to CDSS: aggregation and presentation of rele-
vant details at the point of decision-making reduces the scope
for such mistakes. With increasing sophistication, tools can
integrate relevant history (including recent laboratory results)
and speciﬁc medication-related risks. Interaction with the
ordering clinician can range from ﬂagging up potential errors to
placing more active constraints on what may be requested. Well-
designed software can tackle issues of interpretation by ensuring
that prescription information is presented unambiguously and is
rapidly transmissible. The integration of patient and pharma-
ceutical identiﬁcation schemes using barcode and radio
frequency identiﬁcation (RFID) technology with electronic
prescriptions holds the potential to reduce slips around patient
identiﬁcation and physical dispensation of drugs (box 1). Auto-
mated ﬂagging-up of missed prescriptions and monitoring tests
is also possible with ePrescribing systems.
Interpretation of evidence for the efﬁcacy of such tools is
limited by the variety of outcome measures and construction of
what represents a medication error (objective errors versus events
that result in actual harm).10 Where empirical beneﬁts, measured
in terms of reductions in preventable adverse events, have been
shown with in-patient care, these studies have generally been
carried out in centres of excellence using home-grown applica-
tions.11 12 A 2000 Cochrane review suggested that dosage advice
can be effective in preventing adverse drug reactions, as well as
improving performance in situations where drug levels must be
monitored to prevent toxicity.13 The efﬁcacy of interaction and
allergy ﬂagging is also unclear.14 CDSS that include drug-
management systems appear to improve clinical performance, but
without concomitant beneﬁts in terms of patient outcomes.15
Where ﬂagging systems are optional, they appear to be used
infrequently, while routine ﬂagging may come to be viewed as an
unwelcome distraction. In a 2002 survey of UK general practi-
tioners, 28% admitted to frequently or very frequently dismissing
medication alerts without reading them.16 Dismissing ﬂags
without consideration clearly defeats the purpose of such tools.
Consequently, a synergistic role for the various components of
medication-error-reducing solutions (information to support
decision-making, CPOE, integrated pharmacy management and
automated dispensation) has been suggested.17
Electronic prescribing tools can introduce new sources of risk
that fall into two broad categories. First, there is information-
related risk, where failure to integrate information sources
means that the expected beneﬁts from ensuring relevant infor-
mation is presented are not realised. Second, there are failures of
humanemachine interaction. Such failures relate to both the
way information is presented and requested and, more generally,
the way the tool ﬁts into clinical work patterns.18 Structuring
input can have unintended consequences: for example, the use of
lists for medication dosages could facilitate slips that would not
have happened had the user entered information manually.19
Because of the integration at critical points of care, and
because introducing CPOE is typically with the intention to
supplant existing mechanisms for decision capture, a safety
Box 1 Application of retail point-of-sale and back-office
technologies to improve patient safety in Japan
Integrated point-of-sale and back-office operations that hinge on
common identification and tracking technologies (typically
barcodes) are pervasive in commercial settings, but their possible
benefits in healthcare have only recently begun to be realised.
Tackling patient identification error through the use of bar-coded
or RFID chipped tags worn by the patient is increasingly
advocated as an easy way to address the first of the ‘five rights’
of medication safety (right patient, drug, dose, administration
route and time). Pilot programmes at the International Medical
Centre in Tokyo and Red Cross Hospital in Morioka combine
these technologies with a ‘Point of Act’ system that tracks both
patient activity and consumable use. Every clinical contact
represents a discrete event triggereddlike the checking out of
goods at a cashier tilldby the scanning or entry of an identifier
tag and captured by the system with relevant contextual infor-
mation. This information details what was done at what time and
where, to whom, why and by what means. This event-driven
approach provides a robust method of exploring process flows,
as well as inherently providing stock management capabilities.
Safer care is anticipated from the constraints that are placed on
patient and medication selection (the universal use of barcodes
should guarantee the identity of both), the traceable provenance
of the latter (managing the risk of counterfeiting and batch quality
issues). In addition, the automatic capture of care datadand the
unambiguous nature of the associated contextual
informationdmakes this a useful resource that can be mined
prospectively for unreported adverse events and as a forensic
tool to reconstruct the care journey before any incident.9
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impact at the organisational level is inevitable. The impact may
be covert; for example, users may make unreasonable assump-
tions about the capacity of the tool to control certain types of
error. Explicit understanding of the limitations of tools is
necessary at the level of process design to avoid this problem.
There is also an onus on software designers to ensure consis-
tency: for example, in ensuring that prompts for a given type of
medication error are displayed against all relevant drugs, rather
than as a subset. Other organisational impacts with safety
implications include occupying clinical time that would previ-
ously have been spent on other activities and duplication of
work.20
Speciﬁc types of error could increase where the negative effect
of process change is not fully appreciated. Spencer et al
demonstrated an increase in dispensation duplication and
inappropriate dose-related error associated with the use of
a new CPOE system: the system failed to accommodate the
need to transmit updated prescription information to the
dispensary whenever a clinical decision was made to amend the
dose, instead requiring that a new prescription be issued each
time.21 Concern at this level is further supported by the
observation that mortality can increase after the implementa-
tion of an ePrescribing system and that organisational factors
seem to have a signiﬁcant role.22 As with CDSS, there is
a current lack of regulatory oversight. For example, ePrescribing
systems are exempted from federal oversight in the USA and
UK. There is also a need to develop systems to identify
potential adverse drug reactions prospectively (box 2), rather
than relying on manual reporting systems that have very low
reporting rates.23
Delivering patient-centred care
An emerging theme in healthcare in countries like the UK and
USA is that patients should have greater involvement in the care
that they receive and be more informed about their own health
and the treatments available to them. Technological develop-
ments are facilitating the sharing of information between
patients and clinicians through online services, and such online
access to medical records (ﬁgure 2) results in new opportunities
for self-monitoring and for convenient care delivery (eg, email
consultations).24 Each of these developments can be designed
with safety issues explicitly in mind (eg, patient validation of
information in an electronic record could contribute to reduced
error) while also conferring new risks.
Health systems across the world are now focussing on health
promotion, disease prevention and optimising the management
of chronic diseases. To help achieve this, there is considerable
scope for collecting and utilising information from patients
about lifestyle (eg, exercise, diet, smoking, alcohol consumption,
etc) without the involvement of clinicians. These systems can be
used to collect information directly from the patient, for
example, at a preconsultation interview (remotely via the
internet or in the clinic waiting room). Computerised history-
taking systems can be used in many clinical settings and, when
eliciting data directly from patients, could prove particularly
useful in identifying potentially sensitive information such as
alcohol consumption, sexual health and mental health, which
patients might be otherwise reluctant to divulge.25 26 Computer-
based questionnaires are also useful for gathering important
background data before the consultation, which can then allow
more time for focussing on key aspects of the health problems
within the consultation. As well as improving patient safety,
these systems can also reduce administrative costs, thus
releasing funds for other areas of healthcare.
Mobile telephones have also gained recent attention as a way
of delivering care in developing countries. Mobile phone use is
widespread in both developing and developed nations, and offers
potential beneﬁts over other forms of communication that rely
on infrastructure (eg, postal systems, land-line telephones);
people carry their phone wherever they go and, importantly,
consider it an acceptable route through which to receive private
information. Tailored alerts and prompts facilitate medication
and condition monitoring, thus offering an avenue by which
potential problems can be detected and acted upon early.27 For
patients in remote areas, mobile telephony offers a route to
access care advice when no local clinical staff are available
(box 3).28 Future developments include the ability to perform
simple laboratory tests using chip technology, the results of
which are transmitted to clinicians using mobile connectivity.
However, many of the programmable features on which more
advanced systems depend are not available in the ﬁrst- or
second-generation handsets that are commonly in use in devel-
oping countries. There is also a current lack of guidance around
how to ensure that healthcare interaction conducted using
mobile telephony is safe.29
IT AND PATIENT SAFETY AT THE ORGANISATIONAL AND
SYSTEM LEVEL
Capturing adverse events
Adverse events are important in healthcare because of the scope
for signiﬁcant harm to patients. Worryingly, they appear to be
extremely common.30 In the UK, around 850 000 errors occur
annually in hospitals, contributing towards 40 000 deaths.31
Most events have a mixture of latent and active contributory
causes. This complicates their analysis and can make it hard for
responsible organisations to identify the most effective strategy
for their prevention. Each ‘ﬁx’ has a costebeneﬁt proﬁle and also
represents a potential process change that has its own safety
implications.
Box 2 Prospective identification of adverse drug reactions
using electronic health records, data mining and signal
detection
Current systems for the detection of Adverse Drug Reactions
(ADRs) have serious limitations. For example, the associations
between Cyclo-Oxygenase Type 2 (COX-2) inhibitors used in the
treatment of arthritis and increased risk for myocardial infarction
and stroke were only discovered after these drugs had been used
for 7 years by hundreds of thousands of users. Even where an
association has been described, underestimation of the magni-
tude of risk could delay withdrawal of a drug; for instance, with
the eventual withdrawal of thioridazine in June 2005, many years
after the association with long QT syndrome had been described.
Using information from electronic health records, it is now
possible to consider identifying ADRs prospectively using data
mining and signal detection. This raises a number of technical
challenges, including the large size of the data sets (sometimes
including records from millions of patients) and the difficulty in
sifting out false-positive signals from true positives. However,
successful developments in this area could radically transform
the speed with which ADRs are detected, thus leading to the
opportunity to withdraw a drug or limit its prescribing and hence
improve patient safety.
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Currently, the capture of adverse event in healthcare is
generally through voluntary reporting. Although high rates of
reporting have been successful in reducing serious events in some
industries (eg, aviation), there is signiﬁcant under-reporting in
healthcare. For example, fewer than 10% of adverse drug reac-
tions are reported to regulatory authorities by clinicians. The
reasons for this are complex and include fear of blame, organ-
isational culture, lack of reminders and time effects.
Automated post-hoc identiﬁcation of adverse events holds
signiﬁcant scope to address under-reporting issues; for example,
deaths due to substandard care (box 4). A key requirement for
event identiﬁcation is synthesis of information from disparate
sources in searching for the ‘ﬁngerprint’ of an incident. Inter-
operability is therefore an important requirement for progression
in this area. Speciﬁc prospective monitoring strategies for new-
to-market products that would be amenable to IT-based tools
have also been suggested. Signal detection and data-mining
techniques can also be used to identify other threats to patient
safety, such as clusters of adverse events or deaths following
healthcare interventions.
Aggregation of incidents at organisational and national levels
is also desirable, because the rarity of many events makes it hard
to identify underlying systematic causes. Many countries now
operate central collections (eg, the National Patient Safety
Agency in England) to which events are submitted.32 Automated
analysis of these submissions poses signiﬁcant technical chal-
lenges concerning semantic interpretation of event reports.
Techniques that are likely to yield greater beneﬁts in the near
future are those that facilitate human operators in matching
events and aggregating evidence in ways that can then be
shared. Speciﬁc software tools already exist for certain types of
safety exploration (eg, root cause analysis).
Standards
The current scope for standards in health informatics focuses on
two main areas: data capture and data exchange. From a safety
perspective, both hold the potential to address a number of
issues. Data completeness is essential for many of the tools with
potential safety gains, such as CDSS and ePrescribing.33 Facili-
tating information exchange has direct safety implications:
systematic transfer reduces the scope for transcription errors and
physical loss of data, and can help to ensure that information is
available when needed. Furthermore, when patients are receiving
care from many different providers, ensuring that relevant parts
of their clinical record are available, particularly in emergencies,
has clear safety beneﬁts.
Disease and intervention taxonomies are now common,
driven partly by their role in remuneration in many health
Figure 2 Online patient access to
electronic patient records in the UK.
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systems but also by the need to collect information required for
public health surveillance. Similar work on information
exchange has resulted in a number of standards. Syntactic
interoperability relates to the ability of systems to exchange
information about care and requires both a common message
statement and a model of the care process involved. The prin-
cipal international standard is HL7 (Health Level 7).
Semantic interoperability requires the use of common (or
appropriately mapped) terminologies. Terminologies can also be
related to classiﬁcation systems based on an underlying
ontology, as an ontology is required to map concepts in different
terminologies. However, clinical coding (using a taxonomy to
classify relevant parts of a patient’s medical history) introduces
new risks. The coding must be accurate, especially if the coded
data will have clinical uses. Minimising errors of miscoding
anddimportantlydomission, requires well-designed taxon-
omies with adequate coverage that are applied systematically.
Semantic ambiguities in some coding systems (eg, where
a particular diagnosis can be coded in several ways, as in the
Read code system used in UK primary care) limit the scope for
automated interpretation and introduce a source of risk where
systems cannot handle these variations. The shift away from
paper-based management also introduces new requirements for
system reliability. Systems must be robust to random failure and
have contingencies in place to ensure that clinical work is not
disrupted.
A recurring theme in eHealth is the lack of regulation for
medical software. There is signiﬁcant scope for regulatory
authorities to exact the same demands for reliability that are
used in other industries where software tools are mission-critical
(eg, aviation). The complexity of medical systems is often cited
as a barrier to this regulation; however, simple parameters like
system uptime are easily measurable. Organisations such as the
European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) could also help
to develop international standards.
Implementation issues
The impact of IT tools on clinical processes can be signiﬁcant
but appears to be frequently underestimated both by system
designers and implementing organisations. Risks can occur as
a result of the explicit changes to existing processes that the tool
introduces. Changes in the behaviour of end users can also
occurdfor example, cultural factors, attitudinal elements
including resistance, assumptions (eg, assuming that the tool
offers certain functions) and changes in the proportion of time
allocated to different tasks. Failure to understand these possible
effects carries the risk of patient harm. Introduction of a tool
(and reversion where tools subsequently fail) is disruptive and
Box 3 A consolidated care architecture can help to deliver
safer care in inaccessible locations: the Malaysian
example
Healthcare agencies in developing and newly industrialised
nations face common challenges in providing high-quality, safe
healthcare. These challenges include: variable coverage and
quality of transport, utility and healthcare specific infrastructures
that affect their ability to provide care, particularly outside urban
settings; infrastructural and income-related constraints that limit
the ability of patients to access services; and resource-related
constraints affecting both staffing and equipment. A particular
challenge for the Malaysian Ministry of Health is the limited
access to remote areas and the reliance on boat travel that can
incur significant delays in transferring patients who need urgent
care to secondary centres. One solution, developed from 2003
onwards, is the TelePrimary Care (TPC) project that combines
elements of electronic patient records, Computerised Provider
Order Entry (CPOE), teleconsultation and data-quality-
improvement programmes in a single system. Patients in remote
locations benefit from their clinicians having access to expert
advice to guide diagnosis and initiate early treatment as well as
gaining case-specific feedback as part of Continuing Medical
Education conducted through the system. When patients are
transferred between centres, their entire record is available
through a common system. Medication errors relating to illegible
handwriting and drug interactions and contraindication have been
reduced. A formal programme of evaluation of TPC was initiated
in 2008 and is planned to include evaluation of the impact on
patient safety.
Box 4 Auditing safety at a national level; applying signal
detection to routine outcome statistics to identify failing
care
In March 2009, the UK’s Care Quality Commission (CQC), which
is responsible for monitoring the quality of care in England’s
National Health Service (NHS), completed its report into
standards of care at the accident and emergency department of
a small acute urban hospital. The CQC believed that poor-quality
care directly resulted in over 400 excess deaths over the period
2005e2008. Service availability, ward configuration and staffing
levels were ultimately identified as key contributory factors to
this critical failure, but it was notable that routine monitoring of
outcome statistics played a role in highlighting the potential
problem and triggering the subsequent investigation. Between
2007 and 2008, six ‘outlier’ alerts were generated for this hospital
by a monitoring system that compares condition-specific
mortalities against national figures. Although the hospital had
already been alerted to a possible problem by an elevated
all-cause standardised mortality generated by the same system in
2007, the outlier alerts acted as the trigger for involvement by the
CQC. The data required to calculate these metrics are collated
automatically as anonymised care-episode statistics and
processed for the NHS by the Dr Foster Unit at Imperial College
London.
The monitoring solution adopted in the UK combines
automated routine reporting with national coverage, with
a statistical methodology that is robust to false alerts; for
example, the increased uncertainty associated with measure-
ments involving very small numbers of patients. Prerequisite for
the implementation of this kind of solution is reliable capture of
event data in electronic form and an infrastructure for aggregation
of these data nationally. In the UK, this is achieved in secondary
care by electronically coding the main reason for each admission
through a standard form and the use of a common national IT
infrastructure to aggregate the data for analysis. Coded data
extracted from primary care systems could be used for similar
monitoring work. Beyond the IT components of the solution,
responsible authorities must have processes in place that guar-
antee appropriate action when outlying data are generated. The
judicious use of specific alerts to highlight salient issues can be
advantageous, particularly where the perceived reliability of such
alerts is high.
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itself carries a safety burden. Multidisciplinary working is the
hallmark of modern healthcare; this imposes an additional
burden on IT platforms in meeting the requirements of a team
of users in which each member might have a different set of
priorities.
Understanding safety in all contexts, including IT, requires
a holistic approach considering elements that partition into
those that are speciﬁc to IT (reliability, ergonomics, standards
compliance, etc) and those relating to any process of organisa-
tional change (process redesign, culture, training and compe-
tence). A recent review of UK adverse incident reporting
speciﬁcally identiﬁes training and process integration as speciﬁc
causes in relation to IT.34 Adequate monitoring of implementa-
tion requires systematic planning and oversight throughout the
lifespan of each tool as risks shift from implementation to
ongoing training, sustainability and service level issues. Every
implementation will have a combination of beneﬁcial and
detrimental effects. These may be intended, unintended but
predictable or unintended and unpredicted. Discussion in the
context of IT tools too often focuses on the beneﬁcial, intended
effects. A robust strategy can help identify possible risks (and
devise mitigating strategies) and, postimplementation, identify
those unpredicted consequences that can then be addressed
locally. Captured at an organisational level and beyond, these
analyses can be used to feed into the future design of both
systems and implementation strategies. Examination of patient
safety issues should be a recurring and explicit programme of
work throughout the life cycle of every relevant IT tool.
ISSUES SPECIFIC TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
In developing countries, issues surrounding the use of IT to
improve patient safety are often very different to those in
developed countries. Healthcare workers in developing countries
often lack access to information that could help them provide
safe, effective care to their patients.35 This often results in
substandard medical practice. Improving access to relevant,
reliable and up-to-date information has great potential to
improve the safety of healthcare in such settings.
The Health InterNetwork Access to Research Initiative
(HINARI) Programme, established by WHO in collaboration
with major publishers, enables healthcare workers in developing
countries to gain access to a large collection of biomedical
journals and health literature.36 With improved access to the
internet in many parts of the world, information access initia-
tives such as HINARI could have a major impact on the safety of
healthcare in resource-poor countries. For example, the ﬁrst
undersea cable to bring high-speed Internet access to East Africa
went live in 2009, substantially increasing the number of people
in the area with access to the internet, while at the same time
reducing the cost of access.
A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR IT AND PATIENT SAFETY
Efforts to provide a robust commentary about patient safety in
the context of IT are impeded by ongoing issues of methodo-
logical quality of research and evaluation in the ﬁeld.37 These
issues can be summarised as:
< a fragmented theoretical framework that limits the scope for
consistency in approach and stepwise evolution of the
ﬁelddefforts to establish taxonomies for patient safety are
an important ﬁrst step in tackling this;
< parallel fragmentation in primary and secondary methodol-
ogies for the evaluation of IT tools, which includes all stages
of design and implementation.
The diversity of outcome measures available and the quality
with which investigations are reported are often cited as issues
in the ﬁeld. Both impact critically on the ability to perform
effective synthesis of the literature. The critical gap between the
beneﬁts anticipated from theoretical work and those realised in
clinical practice can only be addressed through well-designed
evaluation programmes around technology implementation.
Lessons can also be drawn from the health informatics literature
on human factors research and human factors engineering.
Most evaluations of IT tools are currently described in the
context of a single product being implemented in a live envi-
ronment. This reﬂects a lack of conﬁdence in developing more
complex study designs that combine robust implementation
evaluation with process, cost-effectiveness and impact analyses
rather than ignorance of the possible organisational and ﬁnancial
consequence of technology implementation. The complexity of
organisational impact can only be well explored with ethno-
graphic approaches, but dedicated between-technology
comparisons in controlled situations are clearly desirable. Efforts
to standardise the approach to evaluation are continuing. Recent
progress includes the introduction of guidelines for evaluation
and reporting of IT interventions (GEP-HI, STARE-HI).38
Consideration of harm as a speciﬁc outcome measure has also
recently been advocated.39
Speciﬁc current topic areas where further research work is
indicated include:
< methods of improving data quality in electronic patient
records;
< identiﬁcation of threats to patient safety using prospective
methods and signal detectiondfor example, pharmacovigi-
lance and postoperative mortality to identify adverse drug
reactions;
< the use of mobile-phone technology to provide prompts and
reminders to patients and to store key medical information
on people with chronic illnesses;
< the use of IT for home-based care delivery and the role of
pervasive sensing and remote monitoring;
< evaluation of information access initiatives such as HINARI
and their effect on patient safety in developing countries.
CONCLUSIONS
This review outlines the potential of IT solutions to improve
patient safety. Although it is developed countries that will
beneﬁt from such technological interventions in the short term,
the rapidly falling cost of IT means that middle-income and
eventually lower-income countries will also eventually beneﬁt.
A key lesson from health systems that have been successful in
implementing IT in healthcare is that a commitment from the
funders of healthcare (whether these are governments, national
insurance schemes or third parties) to meet the costs of IT
solutions is essential to ensuring their rapid and effective take-
up. Countries with health systems where this is not the case,
such as the USA, have had a much lower uptake of essential
technologies, such as electronic patient records, than countries
like the UK and Netherlands, where funders have shown greater
commitment.40 41
Although IT solutions do have considerable potential to
improve patient safety, there is currently a gap between the
theoretical and empirically demonstrated beneﬁts. Given the
lack of evidence on quality and safety improvements and on
costebeneﬁts, future eHealth applications should be evaluated
against a comprehensive and rigorous set of measures, ideally at
all stages of the application life cycle. Attention must also be
paid to socio-technical factors to maximise the likelihood of
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successful implementation and adoption.42 Finally, most of the
research in this area has been carried out in afﬂuent, developed
countries. Detailed case studies and rigorous research are also
needed from middle- and lower-income countries if eHealth
solutions are to be developed that can beneﬁt public health and
improve patient safety across the world.
How, then, can funders and providers of healthcare take
forward the use of IT to improve patient safety? A key step is
introducing the use of electronic patient record systems; these
systems lie at the heart of many eHealth technologies, such as
electronic prescribing and computerised test ordering, as well as
providing data for the identiﬁcation of potential threats to
patient safety. However, the introduction of electronic patient
records can bring its own threats to patient safety, particularly
in the early stages, when healthcare providers could be using
electronic and paper-based records in parallel. One consequence
of this dual usage is that the data held in electronic patient
record systems can be inaccurate or incomplete, with the
potential to compromise patient safety because key data items
(eg, drug allergies or important comorbidities) might not be
recorded. Other key steps are to ensure the full engagement of
clinicians and other professionals, and to provide adequate
training to allow them to use eHealth solutions appropriately. It
is also important that methods for effective data interchange
between IT systems are in place if the full beneﬁts are to be
realised, and to limit the workload and errors that can arise from
duplicate and unnecessary data entry. Finally, the implementa-
tion of IT solutions in healthcare should be linked to an effective
research, development and evaluation agenda to allow appro-
priate lessons to be learnt and to ensure that only systems that
have a real impact on patient safety, quality and healthcare
efﬁciency are disseminated more widely.
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